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Conclusion

STRATEGY IN A MURKY WORLD

Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro

Making national strategy is a byzantine business in the best of times. When dramatic events happen, when the international arena is complex and changing,
when threats and opportunities are uncertain, leaders struggle to understand
and react effectively. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the attacks of 9/11 opened
vistas that were unfamiliar and complicated. How did U.S. leaders manage those
transitions?
In this conclusion, we aim both to clarify and analyze what the United States
did and how it fared during the momentous years that followed the end of the
Cold War. First, we sketch the evolution of strategy from the fall of the Berlin Wall
to the onset of the Obama presidency. We then attempt to identify the accomplishments and failures of U.S. planning under uncertainty. Finally, we explore
some of the key impediments to effective strategy-making in times of uncertainty
and outline what we might learn from the record so that we can do better in the
future.
Recovering the trail of U.S. strategy is no simple task. In the aftermath of
the Cold War, the complexity and uncertainty of the international landscape
confounds our retrospective view. We cannot fully re-create the cognitive and
emotional mind-sets of U.S. officials. Judgments rest on counterfactuals (“things
could have been different”) that presume a grasp of alternative outcomes that are
unknowable. So we move forward aware of our own limitations and recognizing
that we benefit from hindsight. We summarize in broad thematic strokes and
attempt to glean what we can from the mix of insider information and scholarly
analysis.
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Reviewing U.S. Strategy
Despite their limited visibility, U.S. leaders struggled to come to grips with the
challenges and opportunities created by the collapse of the Wall and the attacks
on 9/11. What is notable is that the focal point of U.S. strategy did change dramatically from the end of the Cold War to the onset of the Obama administration: failed states and internal governance eclipsed the fears of great powers. As
dangers and opportunities were reassessed, U.S. officials also reappraised their
ideas about power and their attitudes toward prevailing international institutions. They developed a growing appreciation of the threats that might accompany the march of globalization and open borders.
It has not been easy for U.S. policymakers to think about strategic challenges
in nontraditional ways. From the time Washington assumed a major role in the
international arena after World War II, the main threat had been another state
(the Soviet Union), its lethal capabilities (nuclear weapons), and its hostile communist ideology (“we will bury you”). The crux of American strategy was to
contain or roll back the Soviet Union, co-opt and integrate former foes (Germany and Japan), and win friends among newly emerging nations in Africa, Asia,
and the Middle East. In a world that was undergoing dynamic change as a result
of decolonization and revolutionary nationalism, in a world that had few rules
and that was infused with ideological conflict, Soviet capabilities seemed like the
greatest danger to the United States.
America’s hope during the Cold War was that growing economic interdependence, the attractions of a marketplace economy, and the spread of human rights
and democracy would win adherents to the American way of life and create a
more stable international order along liberal and capitalist lines. To the extent the
free movement of goods, money, ideas, and people could be encouraged, there
was an opportunity to foster a different kind of world. The postwar development
of Germany and Japan provided a comforting precedent; so did the growth of
Western European integration and the dynamic advances of South Korea, Taiwan, and other Asian tigers, as they were once called. U.S. officials hoped that one
day perhaps even the Soviet Union or China would follow this same path.
The American view in the Cold War was binary: threats emanated from the
ideological-political-military realm of the major Communist powers; opportunities stemmed from the productivity of the American economy, the strength
and reach of U.S. military forces, the latent appeal of open trade, the impact
of the communications revolution, and the lure of consumer capitalism. After
11/9 and 9/11, policymakers again hoped to capitalize on these opportunities;
they wanted to persuade other powers to embrace an American vision for the
international order. Yet they had to grapple with the dangers stemming from the
globalization of trade, capital, people, and ideas.
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1989
The immediate challenge facing the United States after the fall of the Berlin Wall
was familiar to U.S. leaders: they needed to achieve a political settlement in Germany (and Eastern Europe), one that would satisfy the major powers in Europe
and win approval from their citizens. It was a formidable task, and the U.S. response to “1989” represents one of the most notable tactical success stories in the
history of U.S. diplomacy. Mary Sarotte says it was a “punctuational moment,”
a time when rapid change takes place and the decisions made shape events—in
ways intended and unintended—for years afterwards. Robert Zoellick incisively
recounts how, notwithstanding the pressures of rapidly moving events and the
demands of constituencies across many countries, the United States was able
to achieve an outcome unimaginable even one year before: a united Germany
within NATO. In his chapter, William Wohlforth highlights the magnitude of the
accomplishment. Most nongovernmental experts, he notes, were critical of the
policy because they expected that rapid change favoring one side’s preferences
would produce conflict, but it did not occur.1
Who was responsible for this victory? Paul Wolfowitz argues that Ronald Reagan was the prime agent. He established the conditions that made rapid progress possible “when the Cold War ice cracked.” Wolfowitz also praises the team of
George H. W. Bush and James Baker for skillfully handling the inter-allied diplomacy, ensuring that the Cold War ended in peaceful and advantageous ways for
the United States. But success depended on initiatives that went well beyond the
agreements over the future of Germany and the accords on strategic and conventional armaments. Zoellick usefully underscores these other dimensions of U.S.
foreign policy—specifically foreign economic policy. Major progress was made
to promote the free flow of goods and capital—setting the parameters that would
lead to NAFTA and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group. These
efforts, Zoellick asserts, nurtured domestic support for international engagement
and encouraged liberalization of the international economy. Although this trajectory had long been characteristic of U.S. policy, officials responded to the new uncertainties in the world arena after the Wall came down by accelerating their efforts
to promote economic interdependence and to spur the pace of globalization.
But it is not clear that foreign economic policy was integrated in a purposeful
way with either the security architecture of Europe or a post–Cold War military
strategy. Zoellick rightly emphasizes the consensus among U.S. officials on the
desirability of economic integration. They believed that integration would foster economic growth, stability, and democracy (as it had in Western Europe).
Policymakers in the Pentagon, such as Wolfowitz and Eric Edelman, shared these
views. But security and economic planning after 1989 nonetheless moved on two
different tracks in response to different pressures and events.
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Officials also faced a clash between long-term opportunities and immediate
demands and risks. U.S. decision makers after 11/9 passed on opportunities to
create new international institutions that proponents thought would be better
suited to deal with the evolving nature of international politics. They did so because they believed that prevailing institutions such as NATO could help absorb
and anchor a united Germany, preserve America’s role in Europe, reassure allies, and allow the United States to manage the immediate aftermath of 11/9.
Although this orientation seemed wise in 1989 and 1990, it appeared less so with
the passage of time. After 1991, reforming and enlarging NATO mostly exacerbated relations with Russia, a formidable former enemy whose partnership was
now desirable in order to build a Europe whole and free as well as to manage
other problem areas such as the Middle East and Central Asia.
John Ikenberry, a well-known political scientist, has argued that after major
victories and in times of flux it is in the interest of the United States to remake
existing institutions.2 Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth have asserted that
the United States could and should have used its position of primacy to be more
activist in creating and shaping international rules.3 These views echo the words
of Douglas Hurd (foreign secretary of Great Britain from 1989 to 1995) who
noted that after 1991 the United States forfeited an ideal opportunity to “remake
the world, update everything, the UN, everything.”4
In chapter 1, Mary Sarotte reiterates this viewpoint. She points out that the
United States made a conscious choice to preserve existing Cold War institutions
rather than create new ones, as leaders had done after 1945. The United States
might have tried to integrate the Soviet Union into the West, perhaps through
a collective European security architecture. Failure to do so, Sarotte maintains,
had serious consequences. Citing the 9/11 Commission Report, she identifies the
rigidity of Cold War institutions and thinking as one of the causes of U.S. vulnerability to the terrorist attacks in 2001.
Of course, at the time, the advantages of alternative approaches were not
self-evident. Zoellick notes that new institutions—especially “third way” ones—
might not have been popular or efficacious in the rapidly evolving international
landscape after 1989. Yugoslavia began to unravel, and vicious ethnic conflict
threatened to destabilize Europe. And at the same time, Iraq invaded Kuwait.
Suddenly, the attention of Bush 41 officials gravitated to questions of internal
governance in failing states and to regional stability. They had to decide whether
to assume the burdens of nation-building in the Balkans and the Middle East,
whether to use their counterattack to defeat Saddam’s army, march to Baghdad,
and tackle the problems of an ethnically and religiously divided Iraq. Bush and
his advisers hesitated to do so. They were not ready to reshape societies they
knew little about or abandon the tried-and-true mechanisms like NATO that had
served the United States so well for so long.
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The Aftershock of 1991
The repercussions of the Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991 revealed an ill-defined U.S. architecture for global affairs. The American
people clamored for cuts in the military budget and for relief from the onerous obligations of the Cold War. Improvising as he went along, Bush 41 heralded a “new world order” and tried to act collaboratively with other countries.
In thwarting Saddam Hussein, he opted to go to the United Nations for approval
for the war, worked closely with the Soviet Union, put together a huge coalition
including major Arab nations, and decided not to seize Baghdad or seek total
victory. He was trying to foster principles such as multilateral cooperation, partnership with the Soviet Union, and great power self-restraint.5
The main strategic planning effort that occurred after 1991 was the crafting
of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). As Eric Edelman and Paul Wolfowitz
recount, this was an attempt to anticipate the emerging post–Cold War world
and adjust to it. Their final report, “Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional
Defense Strategy,” delineated the many requirements to meet the new enemy—
President Bush called it “unpredictability.”6 The authors of the DPG emphasized
the need to safeguard U.S. primacy in international affairs and the importance
of configuring forces to meet uncertain but inevitable crises that would erupt
in regions of the globe deemed vital to U.S. interests. They also stressed the significance of integrating former Communist countries into a community of democracies, the benefits of free trade, and the salience of a U.S. “forward presence”
to thwart the possibility of nationalism and militarism reemerging in Germany
and Japan.7
Although Wolfowitz and Edelman vigorously and insightfully rebut many of
the clichés that have surfaced about the DPG, the planning exercise highlighted
a dilemma that confronts leaders in time of uncertainty: how to deal with wellknown threats from the past and at the same time identify new ones lurking in
the unfamiliar international landscape. In fact, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, new threats in the altered strategic environment were not identified, especially the dangers emanating from failed states and nonstate actors. Planners
focused on state threats—especially from countries with significant power potential in regions of vital importance—and worried about the eventual reconstitution of Russian power. In writing the DPG, they displayed more concern
with states that had power, even if they had good intentions and were U.S. allies (Germany and Japan), than with nongovernmental actors who wanted to
harm the United States. Wolfowitz and Edelman, in fact, make an important
contribution to our understanding of the DPG when they stress that U.S. planners believed that sustained defense spending was needed in part to dissuade
Japan and Germany from remilitarizing. Nonetheless, Edelman acknowledges
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that “the document can be faulted for not sufficiently anticipating the danger
of Islamic extremism, state failure, and terrorism.”8 The same can be said about
their Democratic successors.
U.S. policymakers not only had to deal with a rapidly changing international
landscape, but also with a volatile domestic political scene. The salience of domestic politics was highlighted when James Baker resigned from his position as
secretary of state and became White House chief of staff in August 1992 in order
to manage George H. W. Bush’s presidential reelection campaign. Zoellick describes how Baker tried to forge a campaign plan that “linked America’s foreign
engagement with domestic interests.”9 He failed: voters focused on the domestic
economy and Bush 41 was defeated.
The end of the Cold War sundered whatever bipartisan consensus still remained on foreign policy.10 Thereafter, vicious partisan conflict hindered the
ability to plan coherent national strategy. The opportunity to forge new global
principles, treaties, and organizations compatible both with American traditions
and new global realities was lost.

Democrats in Charge, 1993–2000
For the incoming Clinton team, “the world looked remarkably benign in January
1993.”11 But in an era marked by unipolarity and globalization, the international
environment presented enticing possibilities as well as formidable challenges.
The new administration decided to assign priority to encouraging democracy in
Russia. In his chapter, Walter Slocombe recounts how the linchpin of Clinton’s
strategy—America’s relationship with Russia—was really an effort to shape its
internal political character. The goal was to encourage Russia to become a market
democracy that would be a congenial and reliable international partner.
This objective, however, clashed with another U.S. priority, one that was also
related to internal governance and geopolitics: the enlargement of NATO and the
democratization of Eastern Europe. Many Russian leaders deeply resented the
extension of NATO membership to former Warsaw Pact countries. They saw it
as a violation of agreements signed at the end of the Cold War—a claim that was
not inscribed in any legal document, but that was understandable in view of the
conversations that had taken place in February 1990 between Baker and Mikhail
Gorbachev and between Gorbachev and German chancellor Helmut Kohl.12 The
United States and Russia also parted company over the intensifying conflicts in
the Balkans.
The Clinton administration in effect was adopting the basic strategy developed after the fall of the Wall. This policy was designed to help Russia’s leaders
as long as they acquiesced to U.S. preferences in world politics. The Clinton team
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wanted to avoid a Russian nationalist backlash against that policy. Yet the pursuit of a winner-take-all diplomacy and the existence of a populist tide within
the newly democratic Russia ensured strategic failure. Conditions ripened for
an entrepreneurial Russian politician to exploit popular passions and resentment against U.S. policy. Vladimir Putin, an intelligence service bureaucrat, became that politician. By pursuing a total victory after 1989–90, the United States
sowed the seeds of confrontation that would take root and grow over the next
ten years.
As Slocombe notes, Clinton’s Russia strategy was coherent. The president was
personally engaged and he assigned resources to its achievement. Moreover, the
strategy helped sustain a number of diplomatic successes, including the enlargement of NATO and the resolution of the Balkan wars. Yet, ultimately, the difficulty
of reforming Russia’s internal governance, the clash over NATO enlargement and
democracy promotion in Eastern Europe, and the unreliable Boris Yeltsin undermined the central goal of the administration: a long-term strategic partnership
with America’s former foe in pursuit of a Europe whole and free.

9/11
By the time George W. Bush was elected president, his advisers were beginning
to recognize that political instability abroad, even in smaller states, was a major
challenge for the post–Cold War era. As Philip Zelikow recounts, in the summer
of 2001—before 9/11—National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice began drafting a national strategy with the premise “that in a globalized world where great
power rivalries were fading, the main problems would come from states imploding from within.”13 This, of course, was a distinct change from the “no nationbuilding” rhetoric of the campaign as well as from Rice’s summary of Bush’s
campaign philosophy in her 2000 Foreign Affairs article in which she had emphasized the need to focus on great power rivals and the importance of alliances. But
in July 2001 she was not yet grappling with strategies to reconstitute failed states.
Even today, these many years after 9/11, U.S. officials are still struggling to design
capabilities and policies to deal with this challenge, for example, the development
of counterinsurgency forces within the military establishment and the design of
governance-building capabilities within the State Department.
The attacks on September 11, 2001, like the fall of the Berlin Wall, shattered expectations and impelled new thinking. The international landscape, however, was
no longer one of geopolitical possibility (like after 11/9), but fraught with peril
emanating from nonstate actors. Suddenly, a problem that had been simmering,
but had not been embraced as a top challenge by the George W. Bush administration, now shaped its entire global outlook. In Rice’s 2000 article, “terrorism” was
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mentioned only three times, all minor asides. But she was not alone in slighting
this threat. Subsequently, the 9/11 Commission would call this neglect a “failure
of imagination”—an inability to think beyond a Cold War mind-set in a new
environment.14
Bush and his advisers effectively managed the immediate aftermath of the
attack. Even as they struggled to make sense of what occurred, comfort the bereaved, reassure the public, overcome their own humiliation, and seek revenge,
they successfully identified al Qaeda as the key source of the 9/11 attack. They
admonished the Taliban government in Afghanistan that it must expel the terrorist organization from its territory or face war. When it refused, U.S. officials
quickly took action, routed the Taliban forces, and sent al Qaeda members fleeing
for safety. As Zelikow notes, this reactive effort was at times chaotic and ad hoc,
but it worked.
The record of the United States’ medium- and longer-term approach to the
post 9/11 world, however, was more mixed. On the positive side, the United
States continued to expand trade and promote economic liberalization, themes
of all post–Cold War administrations, but goals that could easily have been sublimated in response to fears about globalization in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.
Zoellick shows how those efforts in the Americas, in Asia, and elsewhere served
U.S. interests.
In political-military terms, however, many of the scholars here argue that U.S.
officials erred. Policymakers attacked Iraq without first addressing the unstable
situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan and without preparing effectively for the
management of a postconflict Iraq. John Mueller contends that Bush administration officials (like their predecessors during the Cold War) exaggerated the threat
and clumsily framed the problem as a “war on terror.” Odd Arne Westad says that
they learned the wrong lessons from the past. Bruce Cumings believes that they
could not escape their hardened mind-sets.

Pathologies of Uncertainty
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the chapters in this book demonstrate that the
United States effectively shaped and adapted to parts of the new environment
spawned by 11/9 and 9/11. Real achievements and partial successes should not
be ignored: the reunification of Germany within NATO; the rollback of Saddam’s
armies in the Gulf War; the reorientation of strategic thinking; NATO enlargement; an end to conflict in the Balkans; and the defeat of the Taliban. But there
were shortcomings as well: opportunities were missed to create and reform international institutions; political, military, and economic initiatives were not well
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coordinated; the dangers emanating from failed states, nonstate terrorists, Islamic
fundamentalists, and Russian revanchists were not sufficiently understood.
How can we account for the failures or inadequacies of strategic planning?
Insightful recommendations for the future depend on analysis of past problems
and achievements. Extrapolating from the chapters in this book, we can group
the main impediments to high-quality planning into five categories: nearsighted
vision, faulty assumptions, domestic priorities, bureaucratic infighting, and procedural shortcomings.

Nearsighted Vision
Overall, U.S. policymakers did reasonably well in responding to the immediate
challenges faced in the wake of both 11/9 and 9/11. This is true in two senses.
First, desirable outcomes were achieved, at least initially: Germany was unified
peacefully within NATO and the Taliban and al Qaeda were defeated in Afghanistan. Second, as Wohlforth points out, actions by government officials were different than those proposed by knowledgeable nongovernmental experts and the
outcomes were better than many independent scholars predicted.
The record for the medium term and longer term is less impressive. Although
we see things more clearly after the fact, there was too little focus on and analysis
of emerging and foreseeable problems such as a revanchist Russia, the fallout
from failed states, the rise of terrorism, and the tribulations of postwar Iraq. Outside experts (who generally have a bad track record on short-term choices and
consequences) displayed a much better understanding of these matters.15
How can we account for this variation in outcomes? Wohlforth suggests that
information and cognitive style make a difference. The pace of change in Europe
was startling in the fall of 1989 as were the pressures to respond to the 9/11 attacks. Wohlforth’s analysis proposes that U.S. officials may do better adjusting
to immediate dangers and opportunities because they have fresher and more
complete information than their counterparts in other countries (and more than
nongovernmental experts). When officials plan for the long term, however, they
face more uncertainty and, therefore, immediate access to information and resources are less decisive. It may also be that the scholarly experts’ hedgehog style
of deductive reasoning is more appropriate for designing longer-term strategy
than for handling immediate crises.
Another possible explanation for the difference is that short-term success
has a blowback effect that impairs longer-term results. Immediate success leads
to overconfidence, dangerous risk-taking, and insufficient attention to newly
emerging problems. Gorbachev’s willingness to go along with U.S. desires, for
example, may subsequently have encouraged American policymakers to believe
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that the Russians would bend to U.S. determination. Likewise, in the Bush 43
administration, the early success in Afghanistan, according to Zelikow, became
“a stimulant to action” that “loosened inhibitions about experiments with new
ideas.” This dynamic encouraged the United States to invade Iraq, an operation
that had previously been deemed too risky.16
Sarotte raises another possible answer. Perhaps it is the case that governmental
leaders need to react to immediate challenges and, having done so, those choices
make it much harder to go in a different direction at a later time, even if it seems
desirable to do so. Bets have been made, reputations staked, and conditions no
longer invite big changes.
In these accounts, government officials, in effect, may behave like corporate
leaders: the desire for short-term returns may crowd out optimal longer-term
strategy.

Faulty Assumptions
Several of the contributors believe that the problems the United States encountered were due to assumptions from U.S. culture or lessons derived from experience that diminished the U.S. ability to read situations accurately. In his analysis
of why the Iraq War went so poorly and why the United States got mired in
Afghanistan, Westad argues that American leaders “misinterpreted the societies into which they intervened and overestimated the U.S. capacity for forcing
change.”17 They were wrong, in Westad’s view, because U.S. decision makers operated according to a set of lessons about interventions and political change that
came from the Cold War in Europe, but did not apply to the situations in Iraq
and Pakistan. If U.S. officials had assessed the conditions on terms appropriate
to the cultural and geographic context of Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf,
they either would not have intervened (Iraq) or would have done so differently
(Afghanistan/Pakistan) and with better results.
Lack of understanding, Slocombe argues, is not always the problem and was
not the central cause of the Clinton administration’s troubles in its Russia policy:
“Knowledge of Russia was greater than that of the Balkans, the Arab world, North
Korea, or Afghanistan.” If there was a flawed understanding at work, it was a
general one about how easy it would be to influence another country’s internal
political and economic order in an era of American dominance. “It is very hard
for outsiders to shape a basic transformation in attitudes and practices in a foreign society and culture.”18
Bruce Cumings also believes that the ways policymakers encounter an uncertain world are bounded by systems of axiomatic presuppositions that skew
their understanding and action. If states respond to crises with “what is on the
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shelf,” then leaders respond to crises with what is in their head.19 Both Acheson
after World War II and Bush 41 after the Berlin Wall came down were driven by
an uncritical belief in the importance of an open, liberal world economy for U.S.
well-being; the interventions after 9/11 were molded by flawed presuppositions
from the post–World War II era about the appeal of freedom, the efficacy of force,
and the success of military occupation (in Germany, Japan, and South Korea);
and estimates of North Korea’s demise have been consistently wrong because
they are not based on an understanding of Korean history and culture.
A clear vision of the future demands an unbiased analysis of current and
emerging conditions. Such an analysis, according to Cumings, is impossible. U.S.
officials cannot help but err; success is accidental. Westad’s analysis is more hopeful. Intelligent extrapolations, he suggests, are possible if situations are better
understood.
John Mueller describes a different phenomenon that has haunted U.S. strategy in times of uncertainty: the need to conjure an existential threat. In his view,
the United States goes in “quest of monsters” that do not exist. After 1945, it
was global communism; after 1989, it was proliferation of nuclear weapons; and,
after 9/11, it was global terrorism. In all cases, the threat was exaggerated beyond
realistic proportions, causing a pervasive and unnecessary sense of insecurity. In
this view, the U.S. approach to uncertainty is addicted to threat mongering and
war making except in rare circumstances when the adversary’s toughness (for
example, Vietnam) chastens policymakers (and the American people)—until
they forget.

Domestic Priorities
When the international arena is opaque, domestic political priorities can loom
large in the making of U.S. strategy. From the day the Berlin Wall came down,
domestic opinion figured prominently in shaping the actions of U.S. leaders.
Bush 41 immediately recognized that in the aftermath of the Cold War new
dangers loomed: the U.S. public might no longer support large defense expenditures and the United States “forward defense” strategy might have to be reversed.
The specter of American isolationism reared its ugly head once again. Bush’s
solution was to embed the newly unified Germany inside NATO, an institution
that required a continued U.S. presence in Europe.20
In chapter 2, Robert Zoellick notes that a motive for the U.S. pursuit of regional cooperation in Asia in 1989 was “to counter a potential resurgence of U.S.
economic isolationism.”21 Successful strategy, he stresses, had to be “connected
to the ‘Home Front.’”22 The American people needed to be shown that U.S. international activity helped further U.S. jobs, competitiveness, and values. “Without
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public support, any U.S. administration will not be able to maintain a strategy of
global American engagement.”23
Concerns about domestic support not only revolved around foreign economic policy; they were focused on the heart of U.S. power abroad: the defense
budget. As Wolfowitz and Edelman recount, the original impetus for the Defense
Planning Guidance process was to provide the United States with a compass in
the wake of the Cold War. But they also stress that the planning document was
an effort to fend off calls for even greater cuts in the defense budget by legislators
who no longer saw dangerous threats in the world.24
When the Clinton administration had to choose between the possibility of
alienating Russia through NATO enlargement and the certainty of alienating domestic constituencies with ethnic roots in the countries of Eastern Europe or in
the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the president and his advisers
decided to assign priority to enlargement. They did not want to lose voters who
were critical to reestablishing and preserving a Democratic coalition that the
Republicans had undone in the 1994 congressional elections.25
John Mueller’s chapter does not explore deeply why threat exaggeration occurs. To the extent it does happen, leaders may be attempting to mobilize against
imminent threats that they believe would not be countered effectively in the
absence of public alarm.26 But leaders may also be manipulating threats to increase their domestic political popularity and to achieve their domestic political
agendas, as many allege Bush 43 tried to do and as often was the case during the
Cold War. In other words, strategy under uncertainty may be shaped as much by
domestic politics as by the evolving international landscape.

Bureaucratic Battles
From the view of Washington insiders there is one central factor that shapes the
way that the United States responds to the external world: the struggle for influence among competing bureaucracies and policymakers. Such dynamics haunt
the dreams of those who aspire to integrate national strategy.
Differences in opinion across bureaucracies, leaks to sabotage plans, hesitancy to voice opinions, and enmity among top decision makers shaped the
ways in which the United States adapted to the post–Cold War and 9/11 worlds.
Even in the Bush 41 presidency, an administration renowned for its relative
cohesiveness, the Defense Planning Guidance was almost gutted by a leak that
revealed a preliminary and yet to be vetted draft. Edelman calls it “particularly
vociferous bureaucratic infighting” that in part was fueled by a policy dispute,
examined by Wolfowitz, between Defense and State over Ukraine leaving the
Soviet Union.27
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Philip Zelikow recalls that the start of the Bush 43 administration was “fractious” and encouraged “factional rivalry.”28 Bush’s style was that of the business
manager who allocated authority to particular bureaucracies depending on the
issue. Decisions were made in different subunits with limited coordination. The
vice president handled some matters, Defense others, and the State Department
had its portfolio. But there were poisonous relations among top officials, and
incessant interlopings across bureaucratic boundaries. Secretary of State Colin
Powell and CIA director George Tenet struggled to preserve the autonomy and
influence of their organizations while National Security Adviser Rice tried to
safeguard her special relationship with the president. The famous National Security Strategy of 2002, in fact, was drafted by Rice, assisted by Zelikow working
as an outside consultant, and had little input from the neoconservatives in the
administration.
Zoellick’s integrated strategy was not coordinated across the bureaucratic
landscape of Washington. It was coherent in his own mind but he was not inclined to lay it out in a strategy statement. Pragmatic, experienced, and skillful bureaucratic players such as Baker and Zoellick were not prone to spend
their time writing elaborate strategy papers, nor was it part of the culture of the
State Department to generate a fully worked out strategic plan for a new world
order.29
In all these cases, the response to complex rapid changes in world politics
was molded by intragovernmental bickering and maneuvering. In most cases,
bureaucratic conflict was a formidable impediment to integrated strategy.

Distorted Process
Scholars can imagine an ideal scheme for how U.S. strategy should be made in
changing and uncertain circumstances. The president convenes a group of the
nation’s top foreign policy officials such as the heads of the NSC, State, CIA,
Defense, and Treasury. They are tasked to gather information and formulate a set
of options across policy domains (economic, military, diplomatic, intelligence,
and so forth). A well-greased interagency process then reconciles divergent views.
After weighing costs and benefits, risks and opportunities, officials present the
president with alternative strategic options. The president then selects the most
effective overall strategy for immediate and continuing challenges. This strategy
is communicated to the bureaucracy, the country, and the world (as needed) to
guide the various efforts (departmental, regional, functional, international, and
so forth) that constitute the nation’s foreign policy.
In reality, U.S. foreign policy often strayed considerably from this ideal as leaders confronted tumultuous times and faced a murky international arena after
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11/9 and 9/11. The record reveals a planning process that involved both rational
routine and ad hoc artistry. The actual day to day policymaking was at times
coherent and well managed, as seemed to have been the case during Brent Scowcroft’s tenure as national security adviser during the Bush 41 administration.30
Managing day-to-day policy, however, is different than long-term strategic planning, which requires presidential input, good personal relationships across bureaucracies, excellent intelligence assessments, and visionary thinkers as well as
policy entrepreneurs who are able to seize the opportunity and guide issues in
one direction or another.
In the period after the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the core of governmental planning was a group of decision makers in the State Department under
Secretary Baker and in the NSC under Brent Scowcroft. People such as Zoellick,
Robert Blackwill, Rice, Robert Hutchings, and Zelikow mapped out the options.
They had thought about alternative scenarios. Some contingency planning for
the breakup of the Soviet Union seems to have been done in a secret task force
headed by Rice (who was in charge of Soviet and Eastern European affairs for the
National Security Council) in the fall of 1989.31 Laggards in the process included
Cheney in Defense and Robert Gates at the CIA, both of whom were skeptical
about the quick deal making with Gorbachev. The administration, however, decided to increase the pace of diplomacy in order to bolster Gorbachev’s stature
inside the Kremlin, but also to prevent him from seizing the initiative.32 Close
relationships between Bush and Scowcroft and Bush and Baker enabled officials
in those organizations to shape short-term outcomes in timely and competent
ways.
Longer-term planning in the Bush 41 administration, to the extent it occurred,
took place in the Pentagon. The president and his national security adviser were
not inclined toward strategic thinking. As Edelman writes, they “lacked the inclination to engage in speculative ‘grand strategy’ or the ‘vision thing’ . . . they had
minimal interest in the debate over a new strategy.”33 Spurred by the Persian Gulf
War, Bush and Scowcroft did reflect on general principles for a “new world order.”
They wanted to act in ways that fostered cooperation with the Soviet Union, enhanced the legitimacy of international institutions and rule of law, and preserved
old and new alliances and coalitions (for example, by not marching to Baghdad
to overthrow Saddam).34 But they had little patience or interest in putting their
ideas on paper in a systematic way and communicating them to the bureaucracy
and the world.
In the meantime, officials in the Defense Department went to work on a document that would provide direction for the contraction, reconfiguration, and use
of U.S. military forces. Their plan, as described by Edelman, was more than simply
military guidance. It incorporated the same “geoeconomic” assumptions that were
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then shaping Zoellick’s thinking in the State Department, but the ideas of State
and Defense officials were not joined in a single document.35 As Wolfowitz notes,
“the Regional Defense Strategy was not a grand strategy.”36 Department of Defense officials were not inclined to share their work with other departments. When
it was leaked, it caused consternation in the White House. The final draft of the
DPG was never championed by the White House. It was released by Secretary of
Defense Cheney at the very end of the Bush 41 administration in January 1993.
The Clinton administration lacked a strong strategic focus. To the extent it
conducted grand strategy, it did so out of the White House. Clinton wanted an
overall approach to the world, but he was not disciplined enough in his own
thinking and leadership style to make it happen, and the world was too complicated.37 Slocombe shows that the administration did have a strategy at least in
one area—Russia. Again, the development of this strategy built not on institutionalized process but on circumstances surrounding the fact that the president
was a college friend of his main Russia adviser, Strobe Talbott, the deputy secretary of state. Otherwise, Clinton and his aides embraced much of the military
strategy and many of the same geoeconomic assumptions of their Republican
predecessors.
Bush 43 was intent on avoiding the critique of his father for lacking “the vision thing,” but floundered until the attacks of 9/11. He possessed a different
approach to policymaking than his father. The president’s preferred CEO management style positioned his key advisers like “the heads of the subsidiary companies seeing themselves less as part of a team, more as executives with their own
responsibilities to discharge.” Although Bush may have been seeking a “team of
rivals,” he encouraged unruly competition. Effective strategic planning in such
a framework was impossible for Rice to orchestrate.38 The immediate response
to 9/11 was generated by an ad hoc group dominated by officials in the Defense
Department, the CIA, and the Office of the Vice President (at least insofar as Afghanistan was concerned). This group remained at the heart of efforts that would
lead the United States into Iraq, but, paradoxically, this was not the group that
authored the notorious 2002 National Security Strategy statement.
Zelikow describes how that long-term strategy was developed within the National Security Council under Secretary Rice and her outside consultants (especially Zelikow himself ). The coordination between the war planning for Iraq
and the overall strategy was not tight. Nonetheless, the immediate demands of
the situation (the desire to remove Saddam Hussein) shaped the drafting of the
broader National Security statement, for example, the emphasis on preemption versus prevention. The strategy statement was a relatively consistent and
coherent vision of overall strategy, but Zelikow also argues that it reflected the
exigencies of the moment.
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The record indicates the absence of a standard process for interpreting dramatic change and reacting to it. Although administrations were configured similarly, officials came together in different ways depending on the predilections of
the president, the expertise and inclinations of his chief advisers, and the relationships among them and their subordinates.39 The classic model of hierarchical
and integrated policymaking captures only a partial picture of what actually occurred. Instead, different bureaucratic actors competed as much as they collaborated. Strategy was often highly segregated and responsive to domestic political
pressures and priorities. Overall there appears to have been little coordinated
political-military-economic strategy in the U.S. government in the post–Cold
War period.

Managing the Murky Future
In many ways, we are still in the post-11/9 and 9/11 eras. Barack Obama introduced his administration’s first national strategy statement in May 2010 by
highlighting that the world is in a moment of transition, “a time of sweeping
change,” which the United States must seek to shape.40 The United States still
struggles to perceive the future of a shifting and complex world in which there
are, as John Mueller quotes, “many snakes to slay, but no dragons.” As terrifying
as the prospect of nuclear war was during the Cold War, the Soviet threat had the
advantage of providing an overarching focus to governmental foreign policy, a
dominant threat around which to focus, and particular opportunities to pursue
when possible.
The priority that should be assigned to different dangers and opportunities
as we look ahead is much less clear. The United States must make sense of how
threats from nation-states compare with dangers from terrorists; how the spread
of nuclear weapons technologies rates in relation to the rise of global warming or
the movement of deadly viruses; and how many resources should be devoted to
building international institutions or alternative energy supplies versus building
effective institutions within troubled countries abroad—or even at home. Officials must also avoid fostering Mueller’s “self-licking” threats that misrepresent
the actual danger.
The authors here are agreed that how the United States plans for the future affects its competence in the world arena. The policymakers—Zoellick, Wolfowitz,
Edelman, Zelikow, and Slocombe—believe that the United States often responded
effectively to the dramatic changes in the world over the past twenty years. They
are certainly right in noting some achievements such as German unification, the
expansion of NATO, and the growth of a global economy based on more open
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markets and freer enterprise. The academicians, on the other hand, see flaws that
have produced costly losses of treasure and lives at home and abroad. They, too,
are right. The record has been mixed, and, to their credit, all the authors point in
varying degrees to both achievements and mistakes in U.S. performance.
Looking across the chapters, patterns emerge. U.S. leaders have tended to deal
with short-run challenges well, but have had more difficulty in managing longerterm feedback and change. They often have relied on outdated and faulty assumptions. In the absence of pressing external demands, they have allowed domestic
political pressures to skew policy; they have not effectively managed bureaucratic
infighting; and they have not always organized an efficient policy process. Most
of these maladies are endemic and enduring; each deserves attention.
There are no absolute cures, but partial remedies are possible. Awareness of
the pathologies is an important step in itself. If policymakers understand what
can go wrong (and right), they can avoid pitfalls and can inspire efforts to take
compensatory actions. For example, an administration that shares Zoellick’s vision of an integrated policy could design a process that does a more effective job
of coordinating the different policy domains. Organizational changes may also
foster that sort of planning. Zelikow, while advising Condi Rice, was worried
about the lack of attention to long-term planning in government. He recommended that an office be established within the NSC to help bring a longer-term
perspective to planning.41
In the midst of our contemporary angst, we should not ignore some instructive lessons from the record of U.S planning since the end of the Cold War.
Planning is not always the key source of effective action and entails its own set of
risks. Lengthy reviews can be undermined and gutted, as seen in Bush 41’s initial
strategic review of 1989, a review that Secretary of State Baker called “mush.”42
Others note the dangers of big planning exercises. Paul Wolfowitz concludes that
“large interdepartmental reviews inevitably tend to kill innovative ideas.”43 Edelman contends that “any document that must go through the bureaucratic maw
ends up being dumbed down to the lowest common denominator.”44
Yet it is also clear that improvising the nation’s foreign policy cannot endure
for long. Focused forethought, alternative scenario consideration, and contingency planning are necessary. As seen in the work of the small Rice group in
the fall of 1989, in the labors of those crafting the Defense Planning Guidance
between 1990 and 1993, and in the efforts of those designing the National Security Strategy of 2002, top decision makers require strategic planning, and
policy outcomes in the long run depend, at least in part, on the quality of such
efforts.
Strategy is important for developing governmental capabilities and communicating purpose to audiences both within and outside of the national government.
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Wolfowitz points out that planning is absolutely essential for making resource decisions to shape U.S. military capabilities.45 And Zoellick argues that articulating a
coherent policy has a potent public affairs function since success may depend on
public support both within the United States and abroad. This was the case with
the Bush administration’s diplomacy in 1989–90, which needed the support of
citizens in the two Germanys as well as from those in other Central and Eastern
European countries.46
Of course, the key to strategy in any U.S. administration is the president and
other top officials who have the ability to organize and invest in a system that
manages complexity and change in ways that mitigate the pathologies above.
Leadership is a critical component of effective national planning. Leadership
necessarily involves quick and decisive action, but, as Wolfowitz counsels, it must
also allow time for strategic thinking, debate, and reflection.
Finally, U.S. planning under uncertainty may benefit from studying the experience of other countries. There is no question that the United States is in some
respects a unique country as a result of its preponderant global power, particular
democratic political system, and geographic location. Yet there are still useful
things planners may learn from other nations in at least two respects. The first
involves the organization and process of planning. Other nations also have to
deal with uncertainty—indeed, in many cases, countries that are smaller and
possess less control over the external world face even more unknowns and risks.
Examining how they have organized themselves to deal with that complexity
may be useful to the United States as it is increasingly intertwined with other
countries and shaped by external factors. U.S. policymakers using intergovernmental networks could explore these comparative dimensions for useful insights
relatively quickly.
The United States might also profit from studying how other nations extrapolate strategy from their planning processes. Countries around the world have had
to deal with the threats and opportunities of a globalizing world. They too have
had to transition away from a long-ingrained Cold War pattern of thought and
decision making. Have some countries done better at this than others? Russia,
the members of the EU, China, and Japan have clearly made different choices in
terms of their emphasis on military development, the integration of security and
economic decision making, and the priority accorded to energy and environmental factors. To what extent have these choices been effective and how have
they been shaped by planning efforts? Looking beyond the American experience
might usefully benefit future American competence. This is a longer-term task
that is perhaps particularly suited to scholarly research.
Strategy requires moving from the knowns to the unknowns and back again.
We know that the United States today faces a world that is uncertain and complex.
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We also know that there will be events that will occur that we cannot foresee but
that will cause further confusion and uncertainty.
Our hope is that a better understanding of how the United States has reacted
in the past will help illuminate the way forward—that has been the goal of bringing together the views of former policymakers and scholars. In this book the
personal recollections of key decision makers add significantly to the historical
record of strategic adaptation—in ways that are both reassuring and troubling.
The chapters by scholars provide critical analysis. Both former officials and nongovernmental experts have a role to play in improving future performance in a
changing world fraught with peril and opportunity.

